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Case Comment
Equal Educational Opportunity
and Public School Finance Reform in Ohio:
Board of Education v. Walter
In Board of Education v. Walter' the Ohio Supreme Court held that
the statutory scheme of financing public education in Ohio2 was
constitutional under the Ohio Constitution. Plaintiffs at the trial court
level had challenged the statutory scheme under two provisions of the Ohio
Constitution: the equal protection and benefit clause 3 and the thorough
and efficient clause.4 The Ohio Supreme Court first reversed the holding of
the court of appeals and the conclusion of the trial court that the statutory
scheme violated the equal protection and benefit clause. The supreme
court then upheld the holding of the court of appeals, which had found
error in the trial court's conclusion that the statutory scheme violated the
thorough and efficient clause.
The legal yardstick used by the Ohio Supreme Court and the lower
courts to decide both issues was "equal educational opportunity (EEdO)."
In this respect the Ohio courts joined a growing number of courts5 and
commentators6 who have relied on the concept of EEdO to analyze public
1. 58 Ohio St. 2d 368,390 N.E.2d 813 (1979). Plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court on Oct. 13, 1979.48 U.S.L.W. 3274 (Oct. 23,1979). That petition was denied on
Jan. 7, 1980. 48 U.S.L.W. 3432 (Jan. 8, 1980).
2. The statutes challenged were OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3317.022,3317.023(A), (B), and (C),
3317.53(A) and (B), 3317.02(E), and § 30 of Am. Sub. S. 221 (Page Supp. 1978). § 3317.53 was repealed
effective July 1, 1978. 1975 OHIo LAWS 525. See Board of Educ. v. Walter, No. C-78001, at 3-5 (Ct.
App. Hamilton County Sept. 5, 1978) [hereinafter cited as App. Op.].
3. OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 2 (Page 1979) provides: "All political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit .... "
4. OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Page 1979) requires the legislature "to make such provisions, by
taxation, or otherwise, as . . . will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools
throughout the state."
5. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728,557 P.2d 929,135 Cal. Rptr. 345, cert denied, 432 U.S.
907 (1977) (Serrano II); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615,376 A.2d 359 (1977); Gindl v. Department
of Educ., No. 54,665 (Fla. Sup. Ct. May 17, 1979); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793,537 P.2d 635
(1975); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389,212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,303
A.2d 273 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466,408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1978); Olsen v. State,
276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); Bus v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976). For an
interesting exclusion from the protection of EEdO, see School Bd. v. Blackford, 369 So.2d 689 (Fla.
App. 1979) (right to EEdO does not include right to be seated in aparticulardesk in a particular room
in a particular school).
6. J. BERKE, A, CAMPBELL & R. GOMEL, FINANCING EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY:
ALTERNATIVES FOR STATE FINANCE (1972); F. CORDASCO, THE EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTED REFERENCES (1973); J. GUJTHRIE, G. KLIENDORFER, H.
LEVIN & R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY (1971); F. KEMERER & K. DEUTSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL
RIHTS AND STUDENT LIFE: VALUE CONFLICT IN LAW AND EDUCATION 501(1979); R. REISCHAUER & R.
HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE (1973); SENATE SELECT COMMINITTEE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1974); A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR
SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1968); YEARBOOK OF EQUAL
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school financing issues. This approach, however, is flawed by analytical
vagaries and avoids the crucial issues facing courts in these cases.7 The
Ohio Supreme Court in particular used EEdO in its analysis to reduce
important issues of law to factual questions of fault,8 thus ignoring
legislative activity that demands legal leadership.
9
EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY (1st ed. 1975); Briggs & Main, Serrano II-A Case of Missed
Opportunities?, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453 (1977); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational
Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305
(1969); Dugan, The Constitutionality of School Finance Systems Under State Law: New York's Turn,
27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 573 (1976); Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A
Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099; Lindquist & Wise, Developments in Education Litigation: Equal
Protection, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1976); McCarthy, Is the Equal Protection Clause Still a Viable Toolfor
Effecting Educational Reform?, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 159 (1977); McDermott & Klein, The Cost-Quality
Debate in School Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 415
(1974); Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of
Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32 (1973); Schwartz, The Public School Financing
Cases: Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14 ARIZ. L. REv. 88 (1972); Silard &
White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 1970 WIs. L. REv. 7; Thomas, Equalizing Educational Opportunity Through
School Finance Reform: A Review Assessment, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 255 (1979); Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA.
L. REV. 945 (1975); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity andthe Courts, 51 TEx. L. REv. 411 (1973);
Comment, An Analysis and Review of School Financing Reform, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1976);
Symposium-Equal Educational Opportunity, 38 HARV. EDUC. REV. 3 (1968); Comment, The Right
to a Meaningful Education in California: Should Dollars Make the Difference?, 10 PAC. L.J. 991
(1979); Comment, South Dakota's System of Financing Public Education: Is It Constitutional?, 24
S.D.L. REv. 365 (1979); Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning
Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972).
7. See Part III infra. Twelve years ago, professor Kurland expressed his feelings about EEdO in
school finance decisions:
I am prepared to make the necessary prophecy. I should tell you then, with some assurance,
that sooner or later the [United States] Supreme Court will affirm the proposition that a State
is obligated by the equal protection clause to afford equal educational opportunity to all of its
public school students. But I should also tell you that such a decision . . . will probably only
be the creation of a greater problem and not a solution to this one.
Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35
U. CHI. L. REv. 583, 583 (1968).
8. See Part III(B) infra. Plaintiffs' certiorari petition alleged that the Ohio Supreme Court
unconstitutionally devised its own findings of fact. See 48 U.S.L.W. 3361 (Nov. 27, 1979).
9. The Ohio legislature continually wrestles with the problems of school financing. Numerous
bills have recently been proposed to solve the issues. See, e.g., H. 1000, 1374, 1378, and S. 494, 112th
Gen. Assembly (1977-78); H. 673, 113th Gen. Assembly (1979-80). Comprehensive changes were
initiated in 1977, and the Education Review Committee, established in 1973 to review continuously the
"administration and effectiveness of elementary and secondary education in Ohio .... was
reaffirmed in purpose. Am. Sub. S. 221, 112th Gen. Assembly §§ 30,52 (1977).
These legislative difficulties arise because the scheme is inherently irrational and inequitable.
Wessel, Why Guaranteed Yield Failed in Ohio, 3 J. EDUC. FINANCE 265 (1978). See also Part II infra.
Recent amendments intended to prevent school closings have only prolonged or exacerbated the
problems. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3317.61-.62 (emergency school loans); 3317.621-.64 (such
loans require the school district to reduce its services to minimal levels); 3317.65-.66 ("school district
income taxes" to repay loans); 3317.487-.488 (control of amount of educational services by state
superintendent); 3317.483 (absolute prohibition of closing schools for financial reasons; must apply for
loans) (Page Leg. Bull. 1979). See Thomas, supra note 6, at 299 ("In sum, educational financing in Ohio
is in a state of operational chaos and legal uncertainty."). See also Alarming School Decision,
Columbus Citizen-Journal, June 21, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
The Committee to Fund Schools Fairly began an initiative petition drive in 1979 to completely
rewrite both the Ohio Constitution and the Ohio Revised Code as they apply to public education. The
proposal would have created a state-wide "basic education fund," established a formula for
distribution of the basic education fund "so that an equal amount of funds can be provided for the basic
education of each pupil in this state," and generally increased taxes and other moneys to fund public
education. The proposal was not placed on the November 1979 ballot. See OHIO ATT'Y GEN.,
SUMMARY AND TEXT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION (certified May 4, 1979).
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This Case Comment will explore public school financing issues in the
context of Ohio law in an effort to propose a precise constitutional
analysis. After setting forth the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court and
the courts below, this Comment will examine constitutional and statutory
law in Ohio dealing with public school financing. The author will then
explain and develop the role that the judiciary has assumed in these cases-
in particular, those cases relying on EEdO-and the problems that have
resulted. The final section proposes a precise analysis of possible
constitutional challenges to public school financing schemes-an analysis
that minimizes the problems associated with the EEdO concept.
I. Board of Education v. Walter
A. Trial Court Decision
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit'0 against various state officers
and agencies 1 in the Court of Common Pleas for Hamilton County,
located in Cincinnati, Ohio. Plaintiffs asked the court to declare the
statutory system of funding public education unconstitutional under the
Ohio Constitution, 2 and to make "such ancillary orders as the rights of the
plaintiffs require.' 3 Plaintiffs' arguments focused on the unequal amounts
of money distributed to school districts under the present scheme of
funding; this inequality resulted from "wholly irrational factor[s]"' 4 that
included voter caprice, district wealth, and the multiple financial burdens
of municipal government.' 5 Plaintiffs then argued that this inequality
prevented a thorough and efficient education and denied EEdO to children
in certain districts. Asserting that the responsibility for a thorough and
efficient education and EEdO lay with the state under the Ohio
Constitution and was not delegable to school districts without sufficient
financial support, 6 plaintiffs contended that the state had violated the
Ohio Constitution by enacting the present system of public school funding.
10. Board of Educ. v. Walter, No. A7602725 (C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977) (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law) [hereinafter cited as Tr. Op.]. The trial opinion, almost 400 pages in
length, is an adoption in toto of the findings and conclusions submitted byplaintiffs. Id. at vi. Members
of the class included
all of the school districts in Ohio, all of the members of the boards of education for such
districts, all of the administrators employed by such districts, all of the students who reside in
Ohio's school districts and who attend public elementary and secondary schools, all of the
parents of such students, and all of the owners of real property and personal property used in
business who reside in Ohio school districts.
Id. at 1.
11. Defendants were the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Board of
Education, the State Department of Education, and the State Controlling Board. App. Op., supra note
2, at 1.
12. See notes 3, 4 supra.
13. Tr. Op., supra note 10, at 1I.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 10-11.
16. Id. at 2.
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1. Findings of Fact
The trial court began its opinion by finding that plaintiffs had "proved
far more concerning the sorry state of public education in Ohio and the
collapse of the school funding system than they originally alleged."'17 In
support of this statement the court detailed in almost three hundred pages
of factfindings"8 the problems with which Ohio schools had been faced in
recent years19 and the relevant sources of those problems.20 The court held
in general findings that
the law does not even purport to equalize the provision of educational
opportunities, or educational resources, to the school children of Ohio, or
even to the school districts. The emphasis of the statutory scheme is rather
upon a measure of equity for taxpayers in the form of equal access to state
aid. . . . At least this much is certain: the level of funding is now so low that
the equalization of the state's resources which are now committed to
financing public elementary and secondary education would result only in the
equalization of poverty.2 '
The court then commented on the relation of this disparity to both a
thorough and efficient education and to EEdO:
The Court also finds that equalizing the taxing capacity of school districts
rather than equalizing the educational opportunities of school children is
inimical to the concept of equality of educational opportunity. In the matter
of education, the State has a duty to see that a thorough and efficient school
system is provided for school children. To ignore that duty and, instead, to
consign the school systems of the districts to the whim of the voters, is to
imbue the voters of every school district with the power to deprive the
children of their district of a satisfactory educational opportunity. Such a
concept is, by definition, the abdication by the General Assembly of its
indisputable duty to make provision for a thorough and efficient system of
common schools throughout the state.22
The court concluded its factfindings by approving a proposed model
school district scheme as a feasible alternative to the present plan. 3
17. Id. at 14-15.
18. Id. at 33-307.
19. See id. at 53-184. "[A]Imost 97% of the 1869 schools which were inspected were found not to
be in compliance with one or more separate [state minimum] standards." Id. at 54. "The total number
of deficiencies in significant categories in all of the schools which were inspected was 7797." Id. at 55.
The closing of school districts was found to be the major problem. Id. at 57-69. The effects of these
closings were disruption of educational development by sequential learning, loss of summer time to
earn money, decreased student and teacher morale, and lost extracurricular activities. Id. at 70-71. The
conditions in urban districts, e.g., Toledo, Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati, were even worse. Id.
at 93-120. At the same time, certain well-financed districts had "great educational opportunities." Id. at
121-40. See also Landsman, Can Localities Lock the Doors and Throw Away the Keys?: Fiscally
Motivated Suspensions of Public Education Programs: A Proposed Equal Protection Analysis, 7 J.L.
& EDUC. 431, 435 n.32 (1978).
20. See Tr. Op., supra note 10, at 185-301. The sources included the failure of local tax efforts,
insufficient financial support for the total system, irrational and unfair property tax machinery, and
neglect of capital needs. In particular, the court criticized the failure of the statutory scheme to
compensate for, and instead compound, these problems. Id. at 209-301.
21. Id. at 302-03. See also id. at 357.
22. Id. at 304.
23. Id. at 307-09. See also id. at 388-89.
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2. Conclusions of Law
The court first considered the thorough and efficient clause in its
Conclusions of Law. Examining the legislative history24 and case law25
interpreting the clause, the court held that
it is clear that the command of the thorough and efficient clause has
historically and consistently been construed by both the Supreme Court and
the General Assembly as that of providing not only an educational system
which has the elements of thoroughness and efficiency but [also] one which
delivers an education of high quality as well as equality of educational
opportunity to Ohio's school children. 6
Listing the problems that beset Ohio's school system, 27 the court
concluded that the entire statutory system violated the thorough and
efficient clause.
The court next applied the equal protection and benefit clause. In
accordance with equal protection "guidelines" of the United States
Supreme Court, 8 the court held that Ohio's schoolchildren have a
fundamental interest derived from their right to attend a thorough and
efficient system of schools-an interest guaranteed by the Ohio
Constitution. 29 For a state to justify discrimination that impairs the
exercise of this interest, it must show a compelling state interest.
30
Rejecting local control of education and lack of financial resources as
possible compelling justifications,3' the court held that no compelling state
interest, nor even a rational basis, existed to justify "such a destructively
,032discriminatory system. Thus, the court concluded that the statutory
scheme also violated the equal protection and benefit clause.
24. Id. at 359-62, 368.
25. Id. at 362-68. The court also briefly mentioned evidence offered by defendants of the
dictionary definitions of "thorough" and "efficient." Id. at 369.
26. Id. at 368-69 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 369-70:
The present system, under which almost all of the schools in the state are found to be unable
to comply with the State Board of Education's minimum standards . . . under which
numerous school districts were forced to close their schools for lack of funds . . . , thereby
causing students to suffer irreparable educational deficits . . . .under which conditions of
educational deprivation exist in more than half of Ohio's school districts . . . including
the state's large urban districts . . . , under which vast disparities exist among Ohio's
school districts in total state and local support ....under which ...only substandard
educational services are delivered to the overwhelming majority of the pupils ...under
which the local tax effort mechanism ...has collapsed of [its] own weight . . . under
which the state has absolutely neglected the capital needs of the school districts ....under
which the funding formula rewards the school districts which have high tax rates because they
have high median income . . .. [and] provides only inadequate and disequalizing subsidies
for its categorical problems . . . imposes penalties upon poor districts for lacking the
funds to comply with statutory mandates ....and under which most of the school
districts are unable to determine their future revenues definitely enough to be able to plan
their curricula and staffing . . . , represents the absolute failure of the General Assembly to
carry out its duty as provided in Article VI, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution.
28. Id. at 372-73. See cases cited id. nnA8-51.
29. Id. at 374.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 378-79.
32. Id. at 377.
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B. Court of Appeals Decision
The State of Ohio appealed the trial court's conclusions of law under
five separate assignments of error, three of which are relevant here.33 In its
first assignment of error the state argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter under the separation of powers doctrine because
the particular issues were "constitutionally committed to a coordinate
branch of government. 34 The court of appeals, asserting its duty to
interpret the Ohio Constitution, assumed that the state was disclaiming all
judicial review, and dismissed such a contention as "devoid of merit. 35
In the third assignment of error, the state explicitly challenged the
authority of the trial court under the thorough and efficient clause to set
educational requirements and to determine the most appropriate method
of securing those requirements.36 The court agreed with the state and held
that the "general rule of noninterference" precluded a substitution of the
court's judgment for that of the legislature on the issue of whether the
statutory scheme fulfilled the commands of the thorough and efficient
clause.37 Thus, the court held that the statutory scheme did not violate the
thorough and efficient clause.
Finally, the fourth assignment of error concerned the trial court's
conclusion that the statutory scheme violated the equal protection and
benefit clause. Using the same federal equal protection analysis as did the
trial court, the court of appeals found that a "fundamental right to the
educational benefits which naturally flow from a 'thorough and efficient
system ... ' "is at least implicitly guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution.38
The court further held that EEdO is required by the equal protection and
benefit clause. 39 From these two premises, the court concluded that the
crucial issue under its equal protection analysis was "whether the
operation of the challenged statutes results in such inequality of
educational opportunities as to impinge upon the fundamental right [to
educational benefits that naturally flow from a 'thorough and efficient
system']."40 The court derived this inequality of educational opportunity
from the conclusions of the trial court: "Because the system is one in which
vast differentials in resources exist among the school districts, the present
33. The two assignments of error that are not relevant to the constitutional issues herein
discussed concern the standing of the state agencies in the plaintiffclass and the certification limits of
the class asserted to be represented by plaintiffs. The court of appeals overruled both assignments of
error. App. Op., supra note2, at 12,28. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the issue of standing in one
paragraph. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 388, 390 N.E.2d at 826. The state did not appeal the class certification
issue.
34. App. Op., supra note 2, at 5.
35. Id. at 7.
36. Id. at 12-13.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 19.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 19-20.
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system ...deprives the school children of Ohio of an essentially equal
opportunity to achieve educationally and equip themselves for future
life."A1
Although the court of appeals did not then expressly hold that this
inequality impinged upon the fundamental rights of schoolchildren, the
court nonetheless proceeded to apply strict scrutiny to the interests
asserted by the state as justification for the statutory scheme. The state
again asserted the need for local control of education. The court rejected
the state's argument on two grounds. First, the court held that local control
over the funding of education permitted voters to perpetuate unequal
educational opportunities in violation of the state's constitutional duty to
equalize educational opportunities.42 Second, local control, including real
property taxation, could be permissible, and important to a certain degree,
under a different funding scheme if the state first complied with EEdO.43
Thus, the present statutory scheme was not the only available means to
foster local control over education. The court of appeals therefore affirmed
the conclusion of the trial court that the statutory scheme violated the
equal protection and benefit clause.
C. Ohio Supreme Court Decision
1. Equal Protection and Benefit Clause
The Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis with the equal protection
and benefit clause. The court approved the "two-tiered test" for equal
protection, explaining that the court "has consistently applied federal
guidelines in construing the Ohio Constitution's Equal Protection and
Benefit Clause.",44 The court then explained the federal two-tier test:
Simply stated, the test is that unequal treatment of classes of persons by a
state is valid only if the state can show that a rational basis exists for the
inequality, unless the discrimination impairs the exercise of a fundamental
right. . . . If the discrimination infringes upon a fundamental right, it
becomes the subject of strict judicial scrutiny and will be upheld only upon a
showing that it is justified by a compelling state interest.
The Ohio Supreme Court then applied what it termed the "strict
scrutiny test" by determining whether a fundamental interest was
affected.46 Initially, however, the court rejected the fundamental right test
of the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School
41. Id. at 21 (quoting from a summary of the findings and conclusions of the trial court's
opinion) (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 22-23.
44. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 373, 390 N.E.2d at 817.
45. Id., 390 N.E.2d at 818 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 374, 390 N.E.2d at 818. The court's analysis here is twisted. The court should have
applied strict scrutiny only if itfirst found a fundamental interest. See, e.g., State ex rel. Heller v.
Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 11 (1980).
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District v. Rodriguez.4 7 This test was summarized by the Ohio Supreme
Court as whether the right was "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution., 48 Under this test, the court concluded, "educational
opportunity would [indeed] be a fundamental interest entitled to strict
scrutiny. '49 The court rejected the Rodriguez test for two reasons. First,
the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution, said the court,
differed sharply in their respective purposes. The United States
Constitution contained those powers delegated to the federal government,
whereas the Ohio Constitution was not one of such limited powers. Thus,
the Ohio Constitution had provisions "not considered fundamental to our
concept of ordered liberty, e.g., workers' compensation."50 Second, the
court criticized the Rodriguez test as going too far, since the right to
acquire and hold property, although guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, would not be considered fundamental by the Ohio Supreme
Court. 1
Without further analysis of fundamental rights, the court ended its
discussion of strict scrutiny by noting that it would be inappropriate for the
issues herein:
Finally, because this cause deals with difficult questions of local and statewide
taxation, fiscal planning and education policy, we feel that this is an
inappropriate cause in which to invoke "strict scrutiny." This case is more
directly concerned with the way in which Ohio has decided to collect and
spend state and local taxes than it is a challenge to the way Ohio educates its
children. 2
The court therefore applied the traditional test of equal protection,
that is, whether a rational basis existed for the inequity. The court
explained this test as placing a burden on the challenger to show
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt, or stated another way, to
show that there are no" 'state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to
constitute a distinction, or difference in state policy. . . .' ",
Plaintiffs, bearing a heavy burden of persuasion for the first time in
this litigation, pointed out the disparity in expenditures per pupil in Ohio's
school districts. The supreme court agreed with defendants' argument that
local control over education supplied the rational basis for this disparate
treatment. Local control, the court held, "meant not only the freedom to
devote more money to the education of one's children but also control over
and participation in the decision-making process as to how those local tax
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Other aspects of this case are discussed in text accompanying notes 129-39
infra.
48. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 374, 390 N.E.2d at 818, quoting 411 U.S. at 33-34.
49. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 374, 390 N.E.2d at 818.
50. Id. at 375, 390 N.E.2d at 818 (citation omitted).
51. Id. 390 N.E.2d at 819. The court quoted the critique of Rodriguez by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (1973).
52. 58 Ohio St. 2d 375-76, 390 N.E.2d at 819.
53. Id. at 376, 390 N.E.2d at 819.
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dollars are to be spent. 54 Further, the court found that the history of Ohio
education law showed an attempt "to ameliorate disparity in the levels of
expenditures without destroying the virtues of local control., 55 Finally,
local control enhanced " 'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence.' ,56 Thus, the court held that the
disparity in expenditures was not so irrational as to violate the equal
protection and benefit clause.
2. Thorough and Efficient Clause
The Ohio Supreme Court prefaced its analysis of the thorough and
efficient clause by discussing the scope of review. The court first reaffirmed
its authority and duty to review statutes for constitutionality: "The
doctrine of judicial review is so well established that it is beyond cavil.,5 7 In
the same vein the court rejected any suggestion that the issues were not
justiciable. Nonetheless, the court recognized the great deference that must
be accorded the Ohio legislature in the area of education legislation,
quoting from an Ohio Supreme Court case decided in 1922: "With the
wisdom or the policy ofsuch legislation the court has no responsibility and
no authority."58 Finally, the court noted that the legislature's discretion in
this area is not absolute, and the court would not permit an effective
deprivation of "educational opportunity":
To state that the General Assembly must be granted wide discretion and that
it is not the function of this court to question the wisdom of the statutes, is not
to say that the General Assembly's discretion in this area is ab-
solute. . . .For example, in a situation in which a school district was
receiving so little local and state revenue that the students were effectively
being deprived of educational opportunity, such a system would clearly not
be thorough and efficient. 9
In a footnote to the phrase "effectively being deprived of educational
opportunity," the court cited Rodriguez for the proposition that a
financing scheme was not unconstitutional absent "absolute deprivation of
education."60
In this case, however, the court held that the legislature "ha[d] not so
abused its broad discretion" when it enacted the present statutory
scheme.6 ' This holding was based primarily on the minimum amount of
money62 guaranteed by the statutory scheme to each school district. This
54. Id. at 377, 390 N.E.2d at 820.
55. Id. at 380, 390 N.E.2d at 821.
56. Id. at 381, 390 N.E.2d at 822, quoting 411 U.S. at 50.
57. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 383, 390 N.E.2d at 823.
58. Id. at 385, 390 N.E.2d at 824, quoting State ex reL Methodist Children's Home Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 105 Ohio St. 438,448, 138 N.E. 865,868 (1922) (emphasis added by the Waltercourt).
59. Id. at 386-87, 390 N.E.2d at 824-25 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 387, 390 N.E.2d at 825 n.14, quoting 411 U.S. at 25.
61. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 387, 390 N.E.2d at 825.
62. $960 per pupil per school district. See text accompanying notes 102-08 infra.
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funding floor only had to be "sufficient to ensure that each child receive[d]
an adequate education."63 Thus, the funding scheme was constitutional
since it attempted to set a funding floor "sufficient to assure that each
school district ha[d] the means to comply with state minimum
standards." 4 Educational deprivation, explained the court, was not the
equivalent of school closings, since there was no evidence that any student
received less than the required days of instruction per year. Nor did
educational deprivation exist in those school districts that offered services
in excess of state minimum standards yet claimed to be "starved for funds."
Finally, the court held, degrees of thoroughness and efficiency were
irrelevant to constitutionality.
3. Justice Locher's Dissent
Justice Locher, in a strongly worded dissent, disagreed with both
holdings of the majority. He would instead have found a fundamental
interest of EEdO and applied strict scrutiny under the equal protection and
benefit clause, since "the fundamental right to equal educational
opportunity is the American Dream as incarnate as constitutional law., 65
The American Dream is thwarted by the archaic and unconstitutional
statutory system of financing elementary and secondary education. Evidence
abounds that Ohio's beleaguered schools are overwhelmed by problems of
such magnitude that the basic needs of pupils go unfulfilled. The majority
opinion flies square in the face of reality, not to mention the findings of fact
and legal conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.66
Locher's dissent, relying primarily on the findings and conclusions of the
trial court, agreed with that court that a clear connection existed between
the disparity in the funding of school districts and the "general malais[e]"
of many schools that were unable to meet even minimum state stan-
dards. 67 Thus, local control, although a rational basis for the statutory
scheme,68 was not a compelling justification under strict scrutiny. The
effect was "a deplorable situation [that] crie[d] out for a remedy., 69
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's holding that the
legislature had not abused its discretion under the thorough and efficient
clause. Again relying on the trial court opinion, Justice Locher found that
some children were forced to attend schools that did not meet state
minimum standards, thereby depriving those children of educational
opportunity. The dissent concluded that "[s]uch a system [was] not
'thorough and efficient.' ,70
63. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 387-88, 390 N.E.2d at 825.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 391, 390 N.E.2d at 827 (Locher, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 391, 393, 390 N.E.2d at 827-28.
68. Id. at 393, 390 N.E.2d at 828.
69. Id. at 394, 390 N.E.2d at 829.
70. Id.
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II. OHIO EDUCATION LAW
A. Ohio Constitution
Two sections of the Ohio Constitution are central to the issue of the
constitutionality of Ohio's public school financing scheme.7' The
education, or "thorough and efficient," clause places a specific con-
stitutional duty on the Ohio Legislature to provide a thorough and efficient
system of schools. 72 The equal protection and benefit clause7 3 prescribes
the manner by which the Ohio legislature performs its constitutional duty
under the thorough and efficient clause.
1. Thorough and Efficient Clause
Although the general duty to educate Ohio children can be derived
from the plain meaning of the thorough and efficient clause, the exact
boundaries of that duty and the extent to which those boundaries have
been constitutionalized have been subject to some debate. The wording of
the clause underwent many changes in the Ohio Constitutional
Convention of 1851 because of sharp differences among the delegates of
the extent of state incursion into management of education.7 4 This
ambiguity of meaning, combined with a history of restrained state
interference with public education,75 has prompted the Ohio Supreme
Court to defer consistently to the discretion of the state legislature on the
scope of the thorough and efficient clause.76
In Miller v. Korns,7 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the legislative
authority to tax one school district for funds to be used in another school
district lay in the discretion reposed in the thorough and efficient clause.78
71. OHIO CONST. art VI, § 3 (Page 1955), which is not considered in this Comment, authorizes the
Ohio Legislature to set up a system of financing public education. For other parts of the Ohio
Constitution dealing with education, see EDUCATION AND THE LAW IN OHIO 31 (1968).
72. See note 4 supra.
73. See note 3 supra.
74. See J. SMITH, 2 OHIO CONSTITUTION CONVENTION: DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS 11-20 (1851).
75. See text accompanying notes 95-101 infra. For a complete history of the development of
public education in Ohio, see OHIO ALMANAC 270-71 (C. Williams ed. 1970); EDUCATION ANDTHE LAW
IN OHIO 29-40 (1968).
76. See State ex rel Core v. Green, 160 Ohio St. 175, 115 N.E.2d 157 (1953) (creation and
modification of school districts); City of East Cleveland v. Board of Educ., 112 Ohio St. 607, 148 N.E.
350 (1925) (state law defeats any municipal ordinance); Millerv. Korns, 107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773
(1923) (tax money for one district can be used for other districts); State ex reL Methodist Children's
Home Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 105 Ohio St. 438, 138 N.E. 865 (1922); Bd. of Educ. v. Moorehead, 105
Ohio St. 237, 136 N.E. 913 (1922); State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54 (1882); State ex rel. Games v.
McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871) ("separate but equal" school system permitted).
Other jurisdictions with similar clauses have divided on the issue of legislative discretion. The
Pennsylvania and Illinois Supreme Courts agree with the Ohio Supreme Court on the issue of
discretion, see Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360,366-67 (Pa. 1979); Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill. 2d 47,58,
360 N.E.2d 360, 365 (1977); but cf. Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 111 2d 567,207 N.E.2d 427 (1965)
(definition of requirements of "thorough and efficient" in dicta), whereas the New Jersey Supreme
Court prescribed the end product of a thorough and efficient education and permitted legislative
discretion only on the means to achieve the end product. See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d
273 (1973).
77. 107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923).
78. Id. (syl. 2).
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In dicta79 the court placed constitutional significance on the phrase
"thorough and efficient" to legitimize further the need for such a taxing
scheme: "A thorough system could not mean one in which part or any
number of the school districts of the state were starved for funds. An
efficient system could not mean one in which part or any number of the
school districts of the state lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment." 0
2. Equal Protection and Benefit Clause
Equal protection is concerned with statutory classifications. 81
Generally, equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions
require government to treat persons equally under certain conditions.
Although all statutes necessarily result in some classification, equal
protection forbids the state to use either arbitrary or invidious differences
between persons when placing individuals in different classifications.82 To
determine whether the state has complied with this constitutional duty,
courts examine the relation between what the state intended to do, that is,
the objective of the legislation, and what the state actually did, that is, the
classification that resulted.83 How close this relation must be depends upon
the importance of the interests to the person affected by the classification,
the extent to which those interests are actually affected, and the groups of
persons classified.
The determinative test that follows this analysis can be either rigid or
generalized in scope, depending on which court decides the issue. The
United States Supreme Court and those state courts that follow Supreme
Court guidelines for state equal protection clauses generally use a rigid
two-tiered test of "all or nothing., 84 In the absence of particular
79. Law not in the syllabus of Ohio Supreme Court opinions is dicta. State ex rel. Donahey v.
Edmonson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 105 N.E. 269 (1913); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.437
(1952).
80. 107 Ohio St. at 297-98, 140 N.E. at 776. See App. Op., supra note 2, at 17. But cf. Tr. Op.,
supra note 10, at 362-64. In Walter, however, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on this passage to show
the limits placed on legislative discretion. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 386-87, 390 N.E.2d at 824-25. See text
accompanying note 59 supra.
81. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60-61 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Ohio Ass'n of Pub. School Employees v. Board of Educ., 28 Ohio St. 2d 58,275 N.E.2d
610 (1971); Continental Can Co. v. Donahue, 5 Ohio St. 2d 224,215 N.E.2d 400 (1966); City ofXeniav.
Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24 (1920).
82. State ex rel. Soller v. West Muskingum Local Bd. of Educ., 29 Ohio St. 2d 148,280 N.E.2d
382 (1972); State ex rel. Cooper v. Warren, 27 Ohio St. 2d 47, 271 N.E.2d 795 (1971); Fleischman v.
Flowers, 25 Ohio St. 2d 131, 267 N.E.2d 318 (1971); Continental Can Co. v. Donahue, 5 Ohio St. 2d
224, 215 N.E.2d 400 (1966); Porter v. Oberlin, I Ohio St. 2d 143,205 N.E.2d 363 (1965); State ex rel.
Hostetter v. Hunt, 132 Ohio St. 568, 9 N.E.2d 676 (1937); City of Xenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437,
130 N.E. 24 (1920). But cf. Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 145-46, 285 N.E.2d 736, 744 (1972) (no
statutory classification created).
83. See Coca-Cola Bottling Corp. v. Lindley, 54 Ohio St. 2d 1,374 N.E.2d 400 (1978); Primes v.
Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); State ex rel. Hostetter v. Hunt, 132 Ohio St. 568,9
N.E.2d 676 (1937); Danson v. Casey, 382 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978); McCarthy, supra note 6,
at 179.
84. See Hawkins v. Superior Ct., 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978) (Mosk,
J., concurring); Schwartz, supra note 6, at 113; Wilkinson supra note 6, at 998. One exception to this
test is sex discrimination cases. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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fundamental interests or suspect groups of individuals, the Supreme Court
generally defers to legislative discretion by requiring only a "rational
relation" between the objective and the classification 85-a requirement
rarely not met by the state. When the Court finds a fundamental interest or
suspect group, however, it generally strikes down the classification under
"strict scrutiny. 8 6
A second test used by other state courts is a more generalized and
fact-focused approach to equal protection. The "sliding scale" approach,
espoused by Mr. Justice Marshall,8 8 concentrates on the material facts of
each case to arrive at a proper constitutional balance. Generally, as the
importance of the interest affected and its infringement by the state
increase, the relation between the objective and the classification must be
closer. This relation is scrutinized for the importance of the interest of the
state in creating and perpetuating the particular classification, and the
extent to which the challenged classification actually accomplishes the
legislative objective. The effect is a balancing of the rights of the individual
or group affected against the interest of the state in using a particular
statutory scheme.89 This approach avoids definitions of "fundamental
rights," 90 and arguably gives state courts a freer hand to determine rights of
individuals against the state.91
The Ohio Supreme Court generally adheres to federal guidelines
when construing Ohio's equal protection and benefit clause.92 In
particular, challengers to statutes dealing with education bear a heavy
burden to show unconstitutionality if based on equal protection, and the
state need only show a reasonable basis to discriminate in the area of
education.94 Nonetheless, prior to Walter, no Ohio Supreme Court
85. Eg., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
86. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,388 (1978); Nyquistv. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1976).
87. See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Alevy v. Downstate Medical
Center, 39 N.Y. 2d 326, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9,554 P.2d 139 (1976). But cf.
Robbiani v. Burke, 77 NJ. 383, 399, 390 A.2d 1149, 1157 (1978) (Pashman, J., dissenting) (majority
ignored sliding scale test of Robinson).
88. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99-103 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,335 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Gammon, Equal Protection of the Law and San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 11 VAL. L. Rav. 435, 470 (1977).
89. See Perry, Constitutional "Fairness:" Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 VA. L.
REv. 383, 388 (1977).
90. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 491-92, 303 A.2d 273, 283 (1973).
91. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv.
489 (1977).
92. Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 57 Ohio St. 2d 115,387 N.E.2d 231 (1979); Primes v. Tyler, 43
Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972);
State ex rel. Platz v. Mucci, 10 Ohio St. 2d 60, 225 N.E.2d 238 (1967); Porter v. Oberlin, I Ohio St. 2d
143, 205 N.E.2d 363 (1965).
93. See City of Dayton v. Cloud, 30 Ohio St. 2d 295, 285 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
94. Meyer v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision, 58 Ohio St. 2d 328, 390 N.E.2d 796 (1979)
(taxation); Towne Properties, Inc. v. City of Fairfield, 50 Ohio St. 2d 356, 364 N.E.2d 289 (1977)
(taxation); City of Painesville v. Board of County Comm'rs, 17 Ohio St. 2d 35,244 N.E.2d 892 (1969)
(allocation of state funds); State ex rel. Ach v. Evans, 90 Ohio St. 243, 107 N.E. 537 (1914)
(classification of school districts by population).
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decision squarely faced the issue of equal protection as it controlled the
manner by which the Ohio legislature provided a thorough and efficient
system of education.
B. Ohio's Statutory Financing Scheme for Education
1. History of School Finance in Ohio
Until 1905, financing of public education in Ohio was accomplished
solely by means of local property taxation.95 Taxation of property by Ohio
school districts, however, had always been subject to constitutional and
statutory restrictions, which required any tax rate in the excess of one
percent (ten mills) of taxable property value to be approved by a majority
of voters in that school district.96 By 1906, these restrictions and the
Industrial Revolution of the late 19th Century forced the Ohio legislature
to provide state funds to "weak school districts. 97
In 1935 the state established its first Foundation Program, providing a
flat grant of subsidies per pupil to each school district and "additional aid"
to poorer districts. The legislation declared that "equalization of
educational opportunities" was an express purpose of the new statutory
scheme. 99 The program was amended several times thereafter to increase
the amount of state aid, to change the measurement standards for
distribution of state funds, and to provide categorical assistance to certain
special programs of the school districts.'00 These amendments eventually
produced a substantially' disequalized funding scheme.'0 '
2. Present Financing Scheme
In 1975 the Ohio legislature enacted an "equal yield" formula to fund
school districts, designed to equalize the property wealth base used by the
school districts to raise operating revenues. 0 2 The formula first sets up a
funding floor of $48 per pupil per mill for every district that levies at least
twenty mills of local property taxation, or a total of $960 per pupil.' 3 The
difference between this funding floor and local district yield per pupil is
supplied by the state.
0 4
95. Tr. Op., supra note 10, at 16; 58 Ohio St.2d at 377-78, 390 N.E.2d at 820.
96. Tr. Op., supra note 10, at 16-17.
97. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 378,390 N.E.2d at 820. The Ohio Supreme Court termed the relationship
thereby created between the state and local school districts a "financial partnership." Id.
98. Tr. Op., supra note 10, at 17; 58 Ohio St. 2d at 378-79, 390 N.E.2d at 820-21.
99. Tr. Op., supra note 10, at 17.
100. Id. at 18-19; 58 Ohio St. 2d at 379, 390 N.E.2d at 821.
101. Tr. Op. at 19.
102. Id. at 20; 58 Ohio St. 2d at 370-71,390 N.E.2d at 816. This formula is a variation ofso-called
"district power equalizing" financing schemes. Id.
103. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.022 (Page Supp. 1978). The $48 figure was increased to S65
in 1979. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.022 (Leg. Bull. 1979). The S960 total was based on a 1974 Edu-
cation Review Committee report that determined an even lower amount to be sufficient to operate at
state minimum standards. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 371-72, 390 N.E.2d at 817.
104. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 371, 390 N.E.2d at 816.
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In addition to this funding floor, the state provides a "reward for
effort." Under this second formula, the state "rewards" districts that levy
millage above twenty mills, up to thirty mills, by setting an additional
funding floor of $42 per pupil per mill, or a maximum total of $420 per
pupil. Again the state supplies the difference between this second funding
floor and the local district yield.105
Certain school districts receive additional state funds. Under "save
harmless" guarantees, districts that received more money under the old
financing system are guaranteed those additional funds regardless of the
new "equal yield" formula."0 6 The scheme also rewards or penalizes certain
districts for compliance or noncompliance with statutory mandates of.
teacher-student ratios, training and experience of teachers, and number of
educational service personnel; financial penalties are subtracted from basic
aid funds.'0 7 Finally, the scheme continues to provide categorical funding
for special programs of school districts.1
0 8
3. Minimum Standards
In addition to financing public education in Ohio, the Ohio legislature
established minimum standards of conformity for all elementary and
secondary schools as early as 1902.09 The legislature in 1956 created the
State Board of Education with the authority to [f]ormulate and prescribe
minimum standards . . . for the purpose of requiring a general education
of high quality."'1 0 These minimum standards set by the State Board of
Education"1 supplement other statutory requirements separately enacted
for elementary schools.'
1 2
III. ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
TO PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCING SCHEMES
Any legal analysis of constitutional challenges to public school
financing schemes must overcome numerous practical and theoretical
hurdles. First is the practical problem of personal bias. Public school issues
strike at the heart of American society.1 3 No analysis can ignore the fact
105. Id., 390 N.E.2d at 816-17.
106. Tr. Op., supra note I0, at 22.
107. Id. at 291-93.
108. Id. at 22-23. This funding is restricted to education of categorical students only. Id. For a
complete breakdown of funding for the Cincinnati School District, see Tr. Op. at 32 (plaintiffs' exhibit
4 41).
109. OHIO ALMANAC 271 (C. Williams ed. 1970).
110. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.07 (Page Supp. 1978).
11I. These standards cover, in both general and specific terms, curriculum and instruction,
instructional materials and equipment, organization and administration, staff personnel, physical
facilities, pupil services, school and community relations, and evaluation and research. OHIO ADMIN.
Com chs. 3301-31, 3301-35,3301-37 (Banks-Baldwin 1970). See also Landsman, supra note 19, at433
nn. 13-18 (minimum standards set by other states).
112. See Omo ADMIN. CODE § 3301-31-01 (Banks-Baldwin 1970).
113. See the discussion of Justice Locher's dissent in Walter in the text accompanying notes 64-
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that a majority of citizens have at one time in their life experienced public
education,1 4 and have consequently formed opinions on what an
education can or should be or do. These personal biases stay with the
graduate of the public education system and surface dominantly when a
person has school-age children of his own. Subjective attitudes of
decisionmakers necessarily interject emotion into any purportedly rational
analysis of education issues.
Second, the subject matter of these issues is theoretically impossible to
define in precise terms. While the general populace may identify an
"education" with school attendance and the process of learning, these
connotations do little for the legal analyst faced with a constitutional
question of educational deprivation.' 5 Such an analyst finds no solace in
the purposely vague terms of state constitutions.
1 6
Third, these challenges center on only one facet of intricate education
issues: public school finance. The relation between the financing of
education and the constitutional rights of children, however, defies
simplistic cause and effect analysis. 17 Consequently, the analysis may
either rely on disputed assumptions '18 or be unnecessarily limited on
scope. 119
65 supra. See also Judge Brennan's "addendum" in Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1,42-43,203 N.W.2d
457, 475-76 (1972):
Even worse than the court's blatant interference with the executive and legislative branches of
government is the inept, confusing, and ambiguous nature of its interference.
...How long will the people permit such judicial meddling in the affairs of state?
How long will the legislature tolerate such pompous interference with their duties?
And when-
When, in the name of all that is sacred in the administration ofjustice will the members of
this court turn a deaf ear to the siren call of executive and legislative politics, and come home
to the dignity of judicial scholarships, judicial decision, and judicial restraint?
114. See the statistics in R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, supra note 6, at 35 (1973) (table 3-9);
YEARBOOK OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 6, at 5.
115. The dictionary definition of "educate" is appropriately vague: "I: to provide schooling for
2: to develop mentally or morally esp. by instruction. ... WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
361 (2d ed. 1974).
116. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONsT. art. XI, § 1 (West 1956) ("establishment and maintenance of a
general and uniform public school system"); CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (West 1967) ("free public
elementary and secondary schools"); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § I (Bobbs-Merrill 1949) ("establish and
maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools"); ILL. CONST. art. X,
§ I (Smith-Hurd 1971) ("efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services");
KAN. CONsT. art. VI, § 6 (1969) ("suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the
state"); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (McKinney 1969) ("maintenance and support of a system of free
common schools"); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Page 1955) ("thorough and efficient system of common
schools"); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (1977) ("establishment of a uniform, and general system of
Common schools"); WASH, CONST. art. IX, § 2 (West 1966) ("general and uniform system of public
schools").
117. See Note, supra note 6, at 1318.
118. The debate rages among commentators on the extent of the relation between the amount of
money available for a given school district to spend and the quality of the education produced. See,
e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 n.56 (1973); Thompson v.
Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 800, 537 P.2d 635, 642 (1975); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 404, 212
N.W.2d 711,719 (1973); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 6; McDermott & Klein, supra note 6;
Comment, Texas School Finance: The Incompatability of Property Taxation and Quality Education,
56 TEx. L. REv. 253 (1978).
119. See, e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. IIl. 1968), aff'd sub. nom.
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Finally, for every judicially determined right there must, of course, be
a legal remedy to enforce that right. 120 When a financing scheme is
reviewed for possible unconstitutionality, the analyst cannot avoid the
difficult problems of who decides which remedy to what extent within how
much time.
As the following section of this Comment will demonstrate, many
state courts, hampered by these and other practical and theoretical
difficulties, have accordingly relied upon vague and ambiguous standards
in constitutional adjudications.' 2' This was particularly true after the
United State Supreme Court lifted the burden from the federal court
system and effectively closed the gate to a mounting flood of federal
constitutional attacks two years after its crest. 22 State courts responded by
employing a variety of devices-in particular, the concept of EEdO-to
either avoid or justify judicial intervention. The Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in Walter is a prime example of the analytical problems this
approach creates rather than solves.
123
A. Case Law Prior to Walter
1. Early Federal Constitutional Challenges
From the beginning, cases challenging public school financing
schemes on federal equal protection grounds were clouded by the issue of
constitutional standards. Although the financial disparity between school
districts was obvious, federal courts early rejected the notion that state
funds had to be allocated according to a child's needs to comply with equal
protection. 24 In the early 1970s, however, the California Supreme Court
in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano )125 constitutionalized the principle of "fiscal
neutrality"'' 26 and held that plaintiffs had a cause of action to invalidate
California's public school funding scheme on federal and state equal
Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (educational needs standard); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360,
368 (Pa. 1979) (Manderino, J., dissenting) (majority examined wrong issue and wrong claims, used
wrong analysis, and arrived at wrong result); and text accompanying note 52 supra.
120. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953 (1703).
121. Other problems that are particularly troublesome to courts are listed in Serrano v. Priest, 18
Cal. 3d 728, 787-90,557 P.2d 929,964-67, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 381-83, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (Serrano fl); Levin, supra note 6, at 1107-14; and Thomas, supra note 6, at 262-
74.
122. See text accompanying notes 129-39 infra.
123. See note 7 supra.
124. See Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. I11, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S.
44 (1970). See also LeBeauf v. State Bd. of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. La. 1965) (refusal to enjoin
funding system of state to accomplish desegregation); but cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844
(D.D.C. 1971) (order to redistribute school funding to prevent racial discrimination, as opposed to
wealth discrimination in Mclnnis).
125. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The comment on Serrano is
voluminous. See, e.g., the commentators listed in Comment, Educational Financing, Equal Protection
of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1324, 1324 n.3; Note, supra note6, at 1303 n.2.
126. This principle is from Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 6, later published in J. COONS,
W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
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protection grounds. "Fiscal neutrality" assumed the existence of a relation
between the amount of money expended by a school district for education
and the quality of the education produced, and prohibited the quality of
public education from being a function of wealth other than the wealth of
the state as a whole. 127 Under this principle interdistrict disparity of
property tax values and personal incomes ("wealth") could not determine
the amount of money available to a school district to spend on education.
This equal protection concept was embraced by both federal and state
courts. 128
2. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court decided to examine the issue
whether interdistrict expenditure disparities in Texas denied equal
protection under the federal Constitution. In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,129 the Court employed its traditional two-
tier test130 and held that the state need only demonstrate a rational basis for
the interdistrict disparity since no identifiable suspect class was affected
and no fundamental rights were infringed upon.13 1 The state justified the
discrimination on grounds of local control of education, and the Court
upheld the funding scheme.
The Court's discussion of a "suspect class" and "fundamental rights,"
however, has led some commentators to believe that a challenge to a
funding scheme on the grounds of an absolute deprivation of education
would be successful under Rodriguez.132 The Court stated that it was
unable to identify a suspect class because the Court had no evidence of
discrimination against a particular group of poor people, nor evidence of
an "absolute deprivation of education" resulting from the Texas funding
scheme. 133 Nonetheless, the Court elaborated on the circumstances that
would justify judicial intervention:
An educational financing system might be hypothesized, however, in which
the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases [that were held to deny equal
protection] would be considerably closer. If elementary and secondary
education were made available by the State only to those able to pay a tuition
assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor"
127. Coon, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 6, at 311 ("Proposition I").
128. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Milliken v. Green, 389
Mich. 1,203 N.W.2d 457 (1972). Numerous other cases were filed. See Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. I,
43,203 N.W.2d 457,476 n. I (Brennan,J.); Levin, supra note 6, at 1111-12 n. 11. See also SENATE SELECT
COMMITrEE ON EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY, supra note 6, at 335.
129. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
130. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
131. 411 U.S. at 40.
132. See, e.g., Porter, Rodriguez, the Poor, and the Burger Court: A Prudent Prognosis 29
BAYLOR L. REV. 199, 227-34. (1977). See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (failure to provide
bilingual education denies meaningful opportunity to participate); Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp.
180 (E.D. Va.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977) (failure to
provide all handicapped children with an appropriate education tuition-free denied equal protection).
133. 411 U.S. at 25.
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people-definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum-who
would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would
present a far more compelling set of circumstances forjudicial assistance than
the case before us today.
34
The class against whom the funding scheme discriminated had only one
thing in common, that is, residence in a district with less taxable wealth.
Such a class, said the Court, was not suspect, since a state had the power to
draw reasonable distinctions between the political subdivisions within the
state.1
35
Although the Court then held that education was not a fundamental
right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court
again distinguished the Rodriguez facts from a situation in which the
results of a funding scheme failed to produce a minimal education:
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [the right
to speech or the right to vote], we have no indication that the present levels of
educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short.
[N]o charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child
with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political
process.
1 36
Justice Marshall wrote a lengthy and detailed dissent. 17 He criticized
the majority's inflexible two-tier approach to equal protection and
advocated his "sliding scale" test,'3 8 arguing that the "overarching form of
discrimination in this case [was] between the schoolchildren of Texas on
the basis of the taxable property wealth of the districts in which they
happen to live."' 3 9 This discrimination could not be justified under
Marshall's test.
3. State Constitutional Challenges and EEdO
Rodriguez shifted the arena to state courtrooms and effectively
limited the battle to interpretation of state constitutions. For various
reasons, 40 however, state courts have gone either way on the issue of
constitutionality of funding schemes under state constitutions.141 In a
134. Id. n.60.
135. Id. at 28 & n.66.
136. Id. at 36-37. Martin Essex, Ohio Superintendent of Public Instruction in 1973, stated that
the decision in Rodriguez was not unexpected and that Ohio would be unaffected by the decision.
Thomas, supra note 6, at 288 n.132.
137. See id. at 71-132. Justice Marshall's clerk allegedly spent several months writing the
opinion. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 258-59 (1979).
138. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
139. 411 U.S. at 96.
140. See Levin, supra note 6, at 1126.
141. Cases in which courts have upheld public school funding schemes against constitutional
attacks are Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88,515 P.2d 590 (1973); Gindl v. Department of Educ., No.
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majority of the cases, the answer depended upon the "education clause" of
the state constitution requiring the state to educate its children, and its
effect on the state's version of an equal protection clause. The con-
stitutional standard created, borrowed from desegregation cases, 42 was
EEdO.1
41
The concept of EEdO, however, is plagued with ambiguities. The
problem with using EEdO as a standard that funding schemes must meet
stems primarily from the numerous possible definitions of EEdO. 144 Some
courts have rationalized their decisions to uphold the funding scheme
because of this ambiguity.1 45 Other courts have adopted varying
definitions or failed to define EEdO. 46 This choice of definition inevitably
influenced the outcome of the case.
54,665 (Fla. Sup. Ct. May 17, 1979); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975);
Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill.2d 47,360 N.E.2d 360 (1977); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368,
390 N.E.2d 813 (1979); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9,554 P.2d 139 (1976); and Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d
360 (Pa. 1979). Cases in which courts have struck down all orpart of public school funding schemes on
constitutional grounds are Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I1), 18 Cal. 3d 728,557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., No. C73688 (Dist. CL
Denver Mar. 13, 1979); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615,376 A.2d 359 (1977); Robinsonv. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S. 606 (1978);
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476,585 P.2d 71 (1978); and Bus6v. Smith,74 Wis. 2d
550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976). In Michigan, the supreme court initially followed Serrano I and
invalidated the funding scheme, see note 128 and accompanying text supra, but, after a statewide
referendum and quick legislative action, the supreme court reversed itself in an amended ordervacating
the prior opinion. Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389,212 N.W.2d 711(1973). SeeThomas, supra note 6,
at 291.
142. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954). See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967); Coleman, The Concept ofEquality of Educational Opportunity, 38 HARV.
EDUC. RaV. 7, 14 (1968); Yudof, supra note 6, at 434-72.
143. See cases listed in note 5 supra. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973), held
that EEdO was guaranteed by the New Jersey education clause by itself. In Bus6 v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d
550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), the court discussed EEdO in dicta, and invalidated the funding scheme
because the means of taxation was unconstitutional. The case is thoroughly criticized in Comment,
Bus6 v. School Finance Reform: A Case Study of the Doctrinal, Social and Ideological Determinants
of Judicial Decisionmaking, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 1071. Three cases considered only the state's education
clause without discussing EEdO: Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill.2d 47, 360 N.E.2d 360 (1977); Dansonv.
Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71
(1978). The Arizona Supreme Court apparently held education to be a fundamental right under equal
protection only to the extent of the guarantees in the Arizona education clause. See Shofstall v.
Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 90-91, 515 P.2d 590, 592-93 (1973).
144. See J. GUTHRIE, G. KLIENDORFER, H. LEVIN & R. STOUT, supra note 6, at xiv; YEARBOOK OF
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 6, at 37-38; R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, supra
note 6, at 72-75; A. WisE, supra note 6, at 146-58 (nine definitions); Briggs & Main, supra note 6, at48 1;
Levin, supra note 6, at 1107-14 (four definitions); Lindquist & Wise,supra note 6, at 1-2; McDermott&
Klein, supra note 6, at 416 (eight definitions); Silard & White, supra note 6, at 26 (four definitions);
Thomas,supra note 6, at 262; Yudof, supra note 6, at 412-13 (three definitions); Comment, An Analysis
and Review of School Financing Reform, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 775 (1976) (five definitions).
145. Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973) (amended order).
146. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728,557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977) (Serrano I1) (equal financial ability to provide students with substantially equal opportunity for
learning); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (same), Gindl v. Department of
Educ., No. 54, 665 (Fla. Sup. Ct. May 17, 1979) (no definition); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473,303
A.2d 273 (1973) (equip a child for role as citizen and competitor in labor market); Board of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S. 606 (1978) (end product); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9,554 P.2d 139
(1976) (no definition). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,71-133
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (no definition).
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Each definition in turn has theoretical difficulties. 147 "Fiscal
neutrality," reaffirmed by the California Supreme Court in SerranoII4t as
the definition of EEdO, rests on the controversial assumption that the
quality of an education depends upon the amount of money expended by a
school district for education. 49 Further, EEdO refers to "equality,"
"education," and "opportunity," each of which represents only an ideal,' 50
rather than justiciable standards.' 5' Definitions based on the outcome of
an education (equal output), or the resources available to be expended
by a school district (equal input), must therefore be guided by notions of
equality; yet "equality of input" ignores the real world differences among
students, 52 and "equality of output" defies statistical measurement.
53
Further, definitions based on minimum adequacy of education completely
ignore the concept of equality.
54
Combining the education and equal protection clauses of state
constitutions to produce EEdO has, in effect, created a constitutional ogre
that has swallowed up the real issues under each clause.' 55 State courts
have been sidetracked by EEdO and consequently have differed on the
crucial issue in the consitutional challenges. In Milliken v. Green,'56 the
court upheld the funding scheme because the challenger could not show a
substantial increase in EEdO if the scheme were declared unconstitutional,
and because the objective of the plaintiffs was, in reality, "tax reform." In
Robinson v. Cahill,157 the court struck down the funding scheme because
the state legislature failed to define the contents of EEdO and failed to fund
a system that complied with EEdO. In Thompson v. Engelking,'58 the
court upheld the funding scheme because EEdO was not a fundamental
right, whereas, in Horton v. Meskill,'59 the court struck down the funding
scheme because EEdO was a fundamental right. In Olsen v. State,160 the
147. See authorities cited in note 144 supra.
148. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
149. See note 118 and text accompanying note 127 supra.
150. See Yudof, supra note 6, at 412 (EEdO is as widely shared a value as monopoly regulation,
monogamy, and peace); Coleman, supra note 142, at 21-22 (EEdO can only be approached, never
reached).
151. For attempts at legal definitions of "opportunity," see Richards, supra note 6, at 41-44;
Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 985.
152. Levin, supra note 6, at 1108-09, 1114.
153. See McDermott & Klein, supra note 6, at 423-32, Thomas, supra note 6, at 264; Yudof,
supra note 6, at 419, 430. Cf. Coleman, supra note 141, at 15 (EEdO should focus on the effects of
schooling).
154. Levin, supra note 6, at 1114.
155. See Kurland, supra note 7, at 590.
156. 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973) (amended order).
157. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
158. 96 Idaho 793,573 P.2d 635 (1975). See also Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88,515 P.2d 590
(1973), and Gindl v. Department of Educ., No. 54,665 (Fla. Sup. Ct. May 17, 1979), both of which held
that the legislature needed only a rational basis to discriminate in the area of education.
159. 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
160. 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
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court upheld the funding scheme because the relative deprivation of EEdO
therein was justified, on balance, by the need for local control of education.
In Bus6 v. Smith, "6' the court struck down the funding scheme because of
the means of taxation, but only after the court established EEdO as the
ultimate, "altruistic goal."162 In Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I1), 163 the court
struck down the funding scheme because EEdO required that the amount
of money available in school districts not be a function of district wealth.
In Danson v. Casey,164 the court distinguished successful EEdO challenges
in other jurisdictions by the significant disparity in expenditures in those
jurisdications, an allegation not made by the plaintiffs in Danson.165 Each
case is a demonstration of judicial groping to overcome the practical and
theoretical difficulties associated with public school financing issues.
In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State,16 6 the court examined two
education clauses 167 without reference to equal protection or EEdO.
Recognizing the need for judicial interpretation along with the difficulty of
defining a term as amorphous as "education," the court described its duty
as setting broad guidelines for a minimum required constitutional
education. 168 The legislature's duties, said the court, were to give
substantive content to the meaning of a "basic education," and then to
fund schools according to that definition by dependable and regular tax
sources. 169 The court then proposed three definitions of a basic education,
none of which were met by the amount of money distributed under the
present funding scheme. 170 The court gave the legislature three years to
comply with its duties.
B. EEdO and Walter
1. Lower Court Decisions
Both the trial court and the court of appeals in Walter were confused
on the guarantees of Ohio's education and equal protection clauses. The
trial court, under the thorough and efficient clause, used the term "EEdO"
expansively in an effort to strike down a funding scheme that the court felt
resulted in equalized taxing capacity but ignored the significant
interdistrict disparity produced thereby.17 ' The court of appeals, evidently
161. 74 Wis.2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
162. Id. at 565, 247 N.W.2d at 149.
163. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
164. 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
165. Id. at 365 n.10 (dicta).
166. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
167. WASH. CONsT. art. IX, §§ 1, 2 (West 1966).
168. 90 Wash. 2d at 518-19, 585 P.2d at 95.
169. Id. at 520-22, 585 P.2d at 96-97.
170. The three definitions were (1) standards established by the state education agency; (2)
accreditation standards; and (3) "collective wisdom" standards that focus on the "normal range ability
student" as determined by the collective experience of educators, parents, and school boards. Id. at
533-35, 585 P.2d at 102-03.
171. See text accompanying notes 21-27 supra.
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attempting to limit the role of Ohio's judiciary in the public school
financing controversy, rejected this expansive interpretation of the
thorough and efficient clause and instead granted complete discretion to
the legislature on the interpretation of the clause. 172 Yet, from the equal
protection and benefit clause the court of appeals extracted both EEdO
and a fundamental right to educational benefits that "naturally flow" from
the thorough and efficient clause.1 73 The court of appeals did not explain
what those benefits were; instead, the court agreed with the trial court that
inequality of educational opportunity existed when children are unable to
equip themselves for future life.174 In this roundabout fashion, then, the
court of appeals managed to define both EEdO and benefits that "naturally
flow" from the thorough and efficient clause, and thus to interpret the
clause itself-precisely the outcome that the court avoided earlier.
2. Supreme Court Decision
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Walter exemplifies judicial
reliance on EEdO that confuses the basic issues of the case and merely
justifies reluctance to intervene in public school financing issues. The
decision, in actuality, is more an essay on the good faith attempts of the
legislature to solve educational finance problems, and on the school
district mismanagement that has caused these problems, than an analysis
of constitutional issues.
Under both the equal protection and benefit clause and the thorough
and efficient clause, "educational opportunity" was the crucial issue.
75
Under the equal protection and benefit clause, the court could not agree,
however, with the criteria used by the United States Supreme Court in
Rodriguez to determine whether a right was fundamental and therefore
deserving of strict scrutiny. It did agree that educational opportunity
would be a fundamental right under the Rodriguez criteria. Since the Ohio
Supreme Court did adopt the United States Supreme Court's two-tiered
test, the next issue should have been whether educational opportunity was
a fundamental interest under whatever other criteria the Ohio Supreme
Court decided to use.
176
Instead, the court decided that the real challenge by plaintiffs was
directed towards the state's method of collecting and distributing tax
money, not the effect of the funding scheme on education. 77 Since the
legislature traditionally has broad discretion in taxation issues, the court
172. See text accompanying note 37 supra. The state had to make two assignments of error,
however, before the court of appeals understood the state's argument. See text accompanying notes 34-
35 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
174. See text accompanying notes 41 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 49, 59 supra.
176. It is doubtful, however, that the Ohio Supreme Court does have different criteria to
determine whether a right is fundamental. See Denicola v. Providence Hosp., 57 Ohio St.2d 115, 119,
387 N.E.2d 231, 234 (1979).
177. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
explained, 78 strict scrutiny would be inappropriate. The court therefore
applied the rational basis test.
The court's analysis of educational opportunity and the rights of
children was therefore only a minor detour. By limiting its consideration to
the state's method of taxation and distribution-and ignoring the effect of
the funding scheme on the constitutional rights of children-the court was
able to find an easy answer to the issues-an answer, however, that
ignored both reality and the allegations of plaintiffs. The cases cited by the
Ohio Supreme Court in support of the broad discretion granted to the
legislature in the field of taxation do not answer this issue; those cases dealt
with classifications created when the state collects taxes, not the effect on
groups of children when the state distributes the money collected. 179 This
issue was discussed by the trial court, which criticized both the intent of the
funding scheme, that is, taxpayer equity, and its effect, that is, interdistrict
expenditure disparities. 80 At no time, however, did the plaintiffs merely
challenge the state's method of collecting and distributing tax money.
The Ohio Supreme Court, therefore, used three methods to avoid the
hard issues of equal protection and educational financing. First, the court
mentioned its concern for EEdO only in passing. Second, it redefined the
issues of the case for an easy answer. Finally, it extended the broad
discretion of the legislature under the equal protection and benefit clause
to include any classifications created by distribution of state funds, as long
as the funds were raised by taxation and used for education.
Similar problems occur in the court's analysis of EEdO under the
thorough and efficient clause. Effective deprivation of educational
opportunity, said the court, was the bottom line of legislative discretion
under the clause. 18' Such deprivation was tantamount to an absolute
deprivation of education, which, the court stated, was required by the
United States Supreme Court to declare a funding scheme
unconstitutional.
182
What the Ohio Supreme Court focused on thereafter, however, was
not deprivation of EEdO, but rather the objectives that the legislature had
attempted to accomplish by the funding scheme.8 3 Thus, the legislature's
intent to set a funding floor sufficient to assure compliance with state
minimum standards justified the funding scheme, regardless of whether the
effect of the funding scheme was an effective deprivation of education.
178. For this proposition the court cited Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356 (1973); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); and Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83
(1940). See 58 Ohio St. 2d at 376, 390 N.E.2d at 819 n.4.
179. See the United States Supreme Court cases cited in note 178 supra.
180. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
181. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
182. See text accompanying note 60 supra. The United States Supreme Court actually held that
an absolute deprivation-of education would enable the Court to identify a suspect class, not to declare a
funding scheme unconstitutional. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
183. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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Although the trial court had detailed the effects of school closings on
educational development and had listed the districts unable to meet state
minimum standards,'8 4 the Ohio Supreme Court ignored these findings
and latched onto the facts that all students had received the days of
instruction required per year and that some districts offered services in
excess of minimum standards.
Again the court's analysis mentioned EEdO, but this time redefined
the issue to one of legislative intent, rather than the effects of the funding
scheme. Apparently, then, if the legislature makes a good faith attempt to
prevent absolute deprivation of education, the effect is irrelevant. This
holding is particularly troublesome in light of a prior Ohio Supreme Court
decision that scrupulously analyzed each minimum standard of education
to determine its effect on the first amendment rights of schoolchildren.'
Here instead, by emphasizing efforts of the legislature to supply districts
with sufficient money to meet minimum standards, and by criticizing
districts that offered services in excess of minimum standards, the court
was solving constitutional issues by laying blame for financial distress on
the districts' own financial management policies. Upon whom the blame
rests for an inability to meet minimum standards of education, however, is
not the issue.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Walter thus represents another instance
of a state court using EEdO in an effort to redefine and thus avoid the
crucial issues-in this case, the effect of the Ohio public school financing
scheme on a child's constitutional rights. The real issues that faced the
Walter court and other state courts will be explored in the next section of
this Comment.
IV. A PRECISE ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
TO PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING SCHEMES
Two distinct constitutional challenges to public school financing
schemes must be distilled from the public school financing reform cases.
Both challenges focus on the results of financing schemes, rather than the
intent of the legislators that created them.8 6 The first result giving rise to a
constitutional challenge is inadequacy of education of one or more
children individually, based on the education clauses of most state
constitutions.8 7 The second challengable result is comparative inadequacy
184. See note 19 supra. See also text accompanying notes 67, 70 supra.
185. State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
186. The intent of legislators in creating a statutory classification may be important in other
constitutional challenges to educational policy, e.g., racial discrimination in segregated schools. See,
e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964). Advocates of
school finance reform, however, do not question the motives of the legislature, but rather the effect of
the financing scheme on the constitutional rights of children.
187. For a list of state constitutions with education clauses, see Comment, An Analysis and
Review of School Financing Reform, 44 FORDHAAM L. REV. 773, 787 n.1 15. In those jurisdictions
without education clauses, a good argument can be made for the right to a minimum education based
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of education, based on equal protection. Although the analyses of these
challenges intermesh, it is possible for one challenge to succeed or fail
independently of the other, and a court must consider each separately and
in correct order.
A. Minimum Adequate Education
A state court faced with these challenges should begin its analysis by
determining the requirements of a "minimum adequate education." State
constitutions or statutes generally form the basis for this claim; a right to a
minimum education could also be claimed under Rodriguez.'88 In Ohio,
since the state has a duty to provide a thorough and efficient system of
education under the Ohio Constitution, it follows that the state must
provide at least some education. This constitutional duty creates a
corresponding entitlement or right'89 to this minimum adequate education
that inheres to every schoolchild in Ohio, regardless of the child's location
within the state. In other words, if the words "thorough and efficient" are to
have any constitutional significance,' 90 there can be no logical disagree-
ment with the proposition that the basics of an "education" must be
supplied to every child in Ohio. Further, the legislative means used to
achieve this minimum adequate education must actually do so; the
thorough and efficient clause nowhere sanctions merely good faith
attempts. The issue for the judicial branch, then, is one of definition: What
are the essential requirements of a minimum adequate education for a
particular district or jurisdiction?
Placing this definitional responsibility with the judiciary has many
advantages. Educational issues are traditionally highly emotional because
of the conflicting needs of the parties in the decisionmaking process: the
legislature's political and economic concerns, teachers' financial demands,
parents' emotional outcries, and the child's unexpressed educational
needs. A neutral third party' 9' can evaluate these considerations and arrive
at a decision in a limited capacity and without the risk of personal bias.
Further, a judicial definition of a minimum adequate education can be
phrased in such a way that accomodates inevitable changes in our society,
yet limits governmental action to present needs. Moreover, public respect
for the judicial branch permits the innovation desperately needed to solve
the education financing dilemma, if the issues are handled within judicial
on substantive due process. See Lindquist& Wise, supra note 6, at 9 n.31. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (right to an education cannot be denied without procedural due process); Mitchell C. v.
Board of Educ., 67 A.D.2d 284, 414 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1979).
188. See text accompanying notes 132-36 supra.
189. See Hohfield, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 30-37 (1913).
190. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
191. This assumes, of course, that judges will separate their own roles as parents and as
decisionmakers.
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authority and with proper discretion. 192 Finally, as in New Jersey,193
judicial activism in this area would have the effect of pressuring other parts
of government into action, rather than permitting drawn-out delays in the
preservation of constitutional rights.
This expansive judicial role in the area of education is not, however,
devoid of theoretical problems. In particular, courts defining minimum
adequate education must justify such blatant interference with the process
of education, an area traditionally considered to be under the near-
exclusive auspices of state legislatures.1 94 The factor distinguishing
intervention in these cases, and not in other areas of education, must be,
bluntly, whether the legislature is doing its job. For example, a court
should not take action to the extent that a legislature has attempted to
define a minimum adequate education by considering all relevant factors,
and has fully funded this minimum adequate education. In this manner
federal courts have successfully limited intervention to specific areas, such
as desegregation. However, intellectual honesty prohibits a court from
justifying reluctance to intervene on grounds of legislative discretion when
the court knows that, in fact, constitutional rights are just not being
upheld.
To eschew the vagaries and other problems inherent in the EEdO con-
cept, the judicial definition must focus on education input, as opposed to
the process of education or educational output. "Input" in this sense means
all resources (financial, human, capital, etc.) devoted to an education; the
"process" is what occurs when the child attends school; the "output" is, of
course, the end product of the process and the input, or what the school
produces. By avoiding consideration of the process and the output of
education, the judiciary necessarily assumes that the input produces these
two aspects of education. This theory presents problems, however,
primarily because education is not the exact equivalent of a sale of
services. 95 A barber, for example, may perform skilled services while the
192. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. I v. Washington, 90 Wash. 2d 476,585 P.2d 71(1978).
193. In New Jersey, the supreme court declared the funding system unconstitutional based on an
education clause similar to Ohio's. After seven successive decisions in over three years, the NewJersey
Supreme Court eventually forced the New Jersey legislature to increase taxes to fund schools by
enjoining the distribution of any state funds under the old financing scheme. See Robinson v. Cahill
(Robinson 1), 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973); Robinson 11, 63 N.J. 196,306 A.2d 65 (1973); Robinson
111, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975); Robinson IV, 67 N.J. 333,339 A.2d 193 (1975); Robinson V, 69 N.J.
449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976); Robinson VI, 70 N.J. 155,358 A.2d 457 (1976); Robinson VII, 70 N.J. 464,
360 A.2d 400 (1976). Although the cases have been criticized, see Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case
Studi, in Judicial Self-Legitimization, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 508 (1977); Fiske, School Funding in New
Jerseiy Renains Separate But Still Unequal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, at E7, col. 1, many
commentators have realized the importance of the case to a quick resolution of financing problems. See
R. LEHNE, THE QuEsT FOR JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 200-07 (1978);
Comment, supra note 143, at 1081 n.45.
See also Silard & White, supra note 6, at 30-33; Thomas, supra note 6, at 301; Note, supra note 6,
at 1340-41.
194. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 74-80, 92-94 supra.
195. See Behrend v. State, 55 Ohio App.2d 135, 379 N.E.2d 617 (1977).
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customer sits passively and merely pays consideration when the barber's
services are completed. In contrast, the process of education requires as
much active participation by the student as it requires quality services from
the school itself to achieve the desired end product. It is submitted,
however, that a state's duties are discharged by regulating inputs of
education; regulation of student participation would be inimical to today's
society. It is further submitted that a worthwhile judicial evaluation of the
output of education is theoretically and practically impossible. 96
Three factors should be central to a state court definition of the
requisites of a minimum adequate education. First, any legislative or
administrative guidelines should be given great deference. 197 In fact, if the
legislature or administrative agency has adequately considered the other
two factors mentioned below, a judicial imprimatur may be all that is
necessary. This deference is due because the legislature and administrative
agencies, as compared with courts, possess equal or greater competence on
the issue of the requisites of a minimum adequate education, since this
issue affects all members of society. These two branches of government
have already undertaken the difficult task of setting educational standards
and deserve judicial respect. Further, as stated above, a court must limit its
intervention into educational policymaking to the extent of legislative
inaction.
Second, a court should consider traditional notions of the
characteristics of an adequate education. 98 These characteristics would
include facilities, teacher-student ratio, academic curricula, ex-
tracurricular activities, and the like. This factor should be based on an
impartial evaluation of the history and status of education in that
jurisdiction, rather than particular judicial beliefs, again to avoid personal
bias. The purpose of this factor is to cover any gap created by the absence
of state legislative history, to allow judicial flexibility in considering
arguments of parties to the dispute other than the legislature, and to
recognize that education of children is a continually changing process that
seeks to avoid problems of the past.
The third factor that a court should consider is the special needs of
various school districts in the jurisdiction. Special problems in a given
district may increase the input necessary to meet a minimum adequate
education. For example, municipal school districts with heavy financial
burdens of municipal services other than schools may have less money to
devote to education than rural districts, and thus need more resources to
operate city schools. 199 In combination, these three factors balance
governmental, general, and specific needs to determine the requirements of
a minimum adequate education.
196. See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
197. See, e.g., notes 109-12 and accompanying text supra.
198. This factor is comparable to the collective wisdom approach. See note 170 supra.
199. This is termed "municipal overburden." See Levin, supra note 6, at 118-19.
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Once the court has arrived at the definition of a minimum adequate
education, the next question would be mathematical and empirical: Does
the present financing scheme operate in a way that discharges the duty of
the state to supply every child in every district with a minimum adequate
education? If the factfinder decides that a child within a given district is not
receiving that minimum education, the court should strike down the
200funding scheme with respect to that district. If the remainder of the
scheme cannot independently survive, the court should strike down the
entire scheme as violating a constitutional or statutory right to a minimum
adequate education.
Assuming that the financing scheme or any part is thereby struck, the
question of remedies arises. At this point a court would be wise to permit
the state legislature the opportunity to select a scheme that completely
finances a minimum adequate education for all schoolchildren, and to
retain jurisdiction to assure prompt compliance with constitutional
mandates.
B. Equal Protection
The second distinct challenge to a funding scheme is comparative
inadequacy of education, a concept rooted in equal protection. This equal
protection analysis necessarily intermeshes with the analysis of a minimum
adequate education. Assuming that every child in the state is receiving a
minimum adequate education under the judicial definition described
earlier,20' the state has necessarily created statutory classifications under
its funding scheme by creating and/ or perpetuating school districts that, in
effect, receive different amounts of input 20 2 depending on the district's
location within the state. How or why this has occurred-that is, because
of the wealth of the district, the burden of other services borne by the
district, or other reasons-is not important to the constitutional analysis at
this point; what is important is that the net effect is a classification of
children by locality created when the state discharged its duty to'educate
those children. A proper equal protection challenge, then, would complain
that the amount of "extra input" that each child receives, that is, input over
and above a minimum adequate education, should not depend on where
that child goes to school.
20 3
Under the present Supreme Court two-tier test, children in a given
200. One of the basic functions of courts is to compel other branches of government to conform
to basic law, and the power to compel performance includes the power to invalidate legislation. State
ex rel. Scott v. Masterson, 173 Ohio St. 402, 405, 183 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1962).
201. See notes 188-98 and accompanying text supra. If the child is not receiving a minimum
adequate education, the funding scheme violates the state's education clause, and not equal protection.
Equal protection is not triggered until the state has first fully complied with the requirements of its
education clause.
202. See text accompanying notes 194-95 supra.
203. "Extra input" should be distinguished from "equality of input," "fiscal neutrality," and
"relative deprivation of education"-concepts associated with EEdO.
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204district would not be a suspect group, nor would their interest in
nondiscrimination of extra input by locality be termed "fundamental. 20 5
Therefore, under the rational basis test, this discrimination would be
validated with little or no justification by the state.
A sliding scale test, on the other hand, is complicated by factual
considerations. Under this test a court must first look to the importance of
the interests of these children and the extent to which those interests are
actually abridged. For example, the importance of a child's interest in
nondiscrimination by locality depends primarily on the extent to which the
amount of extra input in a given district actually produces a "better"
education, a cost-quality correlation disputed by many scholars.0 6
However, nondiscrimination by locality may be more important to
children than to other persons since children have little or no control over
where they live. 0 7 The extent of abridgment of this interest depends on the
actual degree of variance of extra inputs among the different districts.
Against these considerations the court must weigh the interests of the
state in perpetuating this classification, and the extent to which those
interests are enhanced by the classification. The primary interest asserted
by the state in support of this discrimination by locality is "local control."
Local control is composed of two separate concerns of the electorate in a
school district: (1) control over the administration of the school system;
and (2) voluntary choice in providing input above minimum adequate
education levels. 208 These interests are, concededly, historically and
functionally important.2 39 However, the question arises whether a
statutory system actually fosters local control over the amount of extra
input in a given district when such input depends on arbitrary factors-
factors other than voluntary electorate choice2 10-and when local control
204. See text accompanying note 135 supra.
205. See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 658-59, 376 A.2d 359, 379 (1977) (Loiselle, J.,
dissenting).
206. See note 177 supra.
207. For examples of the United States Supreme Court disfavoring discrimination against
children, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538
(1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Cf. Matthews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 n.13 (1975) (illegitimate children are not a suspect class).
One commentator also argues that state compulsion of school attendance is such a "confining
regimentation" that it creates a reciprocal obligation of "equal educational quality." Goodman, De
Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 349
(1972).
208. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 610, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 620 (1971)
(Serrano 1).
209. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 53 n.109 (1973)-
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,469 (1972); Deerfield Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswich Bd. of
Educ., 468 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D.S.D. 1979); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 333 n.20 (N.D.
I11. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); and text accompanying notes 54-56
supra.
210. See Tr. Op., supra note 10, at 270-79, 378-79; Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 30-33, 203
N.W.2d 457, 470-71 (1972); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 27, 554 P.2d 139, 147; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-56 (1978); Levin, supra note 6, at 1122-23.
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is progressively diminished by recent statutory enactment.2" Further,
local control over the administration of school systems may arguably be
effectively encouraged in a manner less detrimental to children's
interests. 2
C. Ohio's Statutory Scheme
Ohio's definition of a minimum adequate education should rely
heavily on the comprehensive regulations of the State Department of
Education.213 In addition, the special needs of urban districts should be
taken into consideration, along with other factors.2 14 The constitutional
requirement of a minimum adequate education is based, as stated above,
on the duty of the Ohio legislature to provide a thorough and efficient
system of education to all Ohio school children.
The factual evidence at the trial court level clearly indicated, however,
that under any reasonable definition of a minimum adequate education,
the legislature has failed to create and fund a system that, in effect,
complied with its constitutional duties. 215 The funding scheme should be
declared unconstitutional under Ohio's thorough and efficient clause, and
the issue of equal protection should not even arise.216 The Ohio Supreme
Court should have retained jurisdiction and given the Ohio legislature a
reasonable opportunity to comply with its mandate.
V. CONCLUSION
Theoretical and practical difficulties with a legal analysis of the
constitutionality of public school financing schemes have led courts to use
ambiguous standards to examine the issues. State courts have thus
combined education and equal protection clauses of state constitutions to
form "equal educational opportunity," a concept that serves only to enable
those courts to avoid real issues. The Ohio Supreme Court used EEdO in
this manner in an effort to redefine the issues facing the court, to avoid
judicial intervention, and to bury criticism of school district management
in a superficial constitutional analysis.
A precise legal analysis of the constitutionality of a funding scheme
should start with a judicial definition of a minimum adequate educa-
tion. If the funding scheme is unable to provide every schoolchild in the
state with a minimum adequate education, the court should declare the
211. Recent statutory enactments in Ohio have put considerable control over education under
the authority of the State Superintendent of Education. See note 9 supra; Thomas, supra note 6, at 299.
For this reason the plaintiffs in Walter filed a separate suit in federal court, alleging that local control of
education is not a rational basis to justify Ohio's funding scheme. Id.
212. See Tr. Op. at 307-36; J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 126, at 14-20;
Levin, supra note 6, at 1123-26.
213. See notes 109-12 and accompanying text supra.
214. See, e.g., Tr. Op., supra note 10, at 388-89.
215. See notes 19, 27 supra; Wessel, supra note 9.
216. See note 201 supra.
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funding scheme unconstitutional. Even if the funding scheme does supply
a minimum adequate education, however, the final step should be an equal
protection analysis of the right of a child not to have the amount of "extra
input" depend upon where that child lives.
Jeffrey L. Hayman
